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Abstract 
Ever since the Supreme Court instituted the one person, one vote principle in congressional election s based on its 
decision in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), intrastate deviations from equal district populations have become smaller 
and smaller after each decennial reapportionment. Relying on equal total population as the standard to meet the 
Court’s principle, though, has raised some constitutional and practical questions stemming from, most basically, not 
every person has the right to vote. Specifically, there is considerable deviation between the current redistricting 
practices and a literal interpretation of this constitutional principle. This study systematically analyzes the differ-
ences between districts’ total populations and their voting age populations (VAPs). Further, we consider how con-
gressional reapportionments since 1972 would change if, instead of states’ total populations, the standard for 
reapportioning seats were based on the VAP or the voting eligible population (VEP). Overall, the results indicate that 
the debate surrounding the appropriate apportionment and redistricting standard is not jus t normative, it also has 
notable practical consequences. 
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1. Introduction 
It is no surprise that the question of representation has 
been one of the greatest concerns at and since the 
Constitutional Convention. The laws establishing the 
number of representatives and their electoral jurisdic-
tions determine, in part, which voters have the most 
influence in affecting the political process and by ex-
tension the type, quality, and tenor of representation. 
Both congressional reapportionment and redistricting 
are currently guided—though to varying degrees—by 
the principle, as solidified by the 14th Amendment, of 
population equality as determined by the total number 
of enumerated individuals within a state or district, 
respectively. But, American legal history is replete with 
examples of challenges to how political equality is 
defined and implemented. These include normative, 
legal, political, and computational issues and each may 
have profound practical consequences. 
In this study we address some of the potential con-
sequences of some of the challenges to the current 
standards and definitions used for congressional appor-
tionment and redistricting. 
 Politics and Governance, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 1, Pages 4-31 5 
First, we briefly explore the historical changes to 
and the debates over these standards and definitions. 
In doing so, we argue that although congressional ap-
portionment and redistricting are, of course, distinct 
processes with their own legal foundations, there are 
still a number of normative, constitutional, and empiri-
cal ties between them, which leaves open the possibil-
ity of future changes to them and makes an alternative 
analysis of each a worthy endeavor. 
Second, we empirically assess the one person, one 
vote principle in American redistricting by comparing 
the legal status quo of total population equality to an 
alternative measure: voting age population (VAP). We 
do so for when the use of VAP is legally required in 
determining majority-minority districts, as well as 
when it is not, in evaluations of the one person, one 
vote principle. 
Third, while acknowledging the constitutional diffi-
culties of such a change, we empirically assess con-
gressional apportionment by comparing the legal 
status quo of apportioning U.S. House seats according 
to total population to the consequences of apportion-
ing on VAP or voting eligible population (VEP). 
Fourth, we empirically evaluate the one person, 
one vote standard as applied to congressional appor-
tionment for all three of these population measures. 
Fifth, we estimate the effect that any of these appor-
tionment changes would have on the distribution of 
Electoral College votes. 
Overall, the intrastate analyses show that despite 
notable reductions in district deviations from equal 
total population, there has not been a corresponding 
decline in deviations away from equal voting age popu-
lation. The interstate analyses reveal that reappor-
tionments based on the VAP and VEP would 
considerably alter the redistribution of U.S. House 
seats and this would marginally benefit the Democratic 
Party in presidential elections. 
2. The Defining of “Total Population” and “One Per-
son, One Vote” 
As any introductory American government textbook 
explains, the issue of representation carried the most 
importance among the various debates at the 1787 
Constitutional Convention. The opposing positions of 
delegates representing large states (i.e., Virginia) and 
small states (i.e., New Jersey) were eventually re-
solved, appropriately enough by the Connecticut Com-
promise, a medium-sized state led by Roger Sherman, 
who successfully advocated for an upper chamber with 
representation set at two Senators per state and a 
lower chamber whose representation was based on a 
state’s population. This “Great Compromise” not only 
mollified the opposition to tying representation to 
population in one chamber, but just as fundamental, 
by denoting slaves as three-fifths of a person in the 
apportionment process, the opposing interests of 
northern and southern delegates were temporarily 
assuaged. In many important and fundamental ways, 
achieving this compromise did not preclude, of course, 
many highly contested subsequent political battles and 
changes in an attempt to make congressional repre-
sentation, among other things, align more closely with 
the founding’s democratic ideals. 
The most significant and obvious change to con-
gressional apportionment occurred with the passage of 
the 14th Amendment to the Constitution in 1868, 
which repealed the “original sin” of the Great Com-
promise and finally included all African Americans as 
whole persons in the apportionment of seats to the 
U.S. House of Representatives. But much of 19th and 
early 20th century American history is replete with 
other contestations of congressional apportionment, 
such as over which apportionment formula is fairer as 
well as when and where to add “bonus” seats (Balinski 
& Young, 2001). For instance, after the 1870 Census, 
283 seats were apportioned by population while an 
additional nine seats were added to a few states as a 
political favor. The distribution of these resulting 292 
seats was not possible with either of the apportion-
ment formulas used at the time and these bonus seats 
ended up making the difference in the 1876 presiden-
tial election. Despite many changes in the formula and 
except for the few bonus seats, since 1868 congres-
sional apportionment has been assigned to each state 
according to their total population. 
Yet, the definition of “total population” since pas-
sage of the 14th Amendment continues to undergo 
changes and challenges (Anderson, 1988). For exam-
ple, it was not until 1940 that the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral declared that all Native Americans were 
considered taxed and thus all were included in the 
apportionment enumeration by the U.S. Census (39 
Op. Att’y Gen. 518 (1940)). And, the definition of a 
state’s total apportionment population was officially 
augmented in 1970, but not in 1980, and was again 
from 1990 to the present defined to include some 
individuals overseas. This includes U.S. military per-
sonnel as well as Federal civilian employees and their 
dependents living with them. Others who are overseas, 
such as the Merchant Marines, fishing trawlers, float-
ing processers, tuna boats, etc., were counted in their 
state’s total population, but not included in the state’s 
apportionment total populations (Mills, 1993).1 Inter-
estingly, none of these overseas populations are in-
cluded in the “total populations” used for redistricting. 
                                                             
1 The definition and inclusion of the overseas populations is more 
complicated and nuanced than the summary text description. For 
instance, many overseas individuals were simply added to the Cen-
sus counts in 1870, 1880, and 1900. After the 1990 Census, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts sued to exclude overseas popula-
tions. The Supreme Court, in Franklin v. Massachusetts (1992), 
declared their inclusion constitutional. 
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Also, more recently, there have been Supreme 
Court challenges to the Census’s calculation of total 
population and its use of data imputation, statistical 
sampling, and the use of unadjusted figures (see Utah 
v. Evans 2002; Department of Commerce v. United 
States House 1999; Wisconsin v. City of New York et al. 
1996) as well as to the constitutionality of including 
non-immigrant foreign nationals in a state’s appor-
tionment enumeration (Louisiana v. Bryson 2011). In 
sum, while the standard for congressional apportion-
ment of total population is defined in the Constitution 
and would likely require a constitutional amendment 
to considerably alter it, we also should not think of it as 
immutable. 
Whatever the definition of and the procedures 
used to calculate the total population of a state, that 
figure (based on the apportionment formula) is then 
used to allocate to each state its number of U.S. House 
seats. And, the districting of those seats within a state 
has witnessed a history of contestations similar to 
those associated with apportionment. For instance, 
intrastate population equality among districts was not a 
particularly valued principle for much of the first half of 
the 20th century; in fact, northern and southern politi-
cians alike often actively opposed any change toward 
greater equality. Both parties had many districts out-
side of major urban centers with proportionally fewer 
residents; these rural voters’ interests, thus, received 
outsized attention (Ansolabehere, Gerber, & Snyder, 
2002). In partisan terms, this meant that congressional 
districts in the North were often biased in favor of 
Republicans and U.S. House boundaries in the South 
perpetuated the longstanding hegemony of rural Dem-
ocrats (Cox & Katz, 2002). Rare was the state that con-
sidered redistricting in accordance with population 
equality. Rather the status quo was generally upheld, 
and this included often incorporating newly appor-
tioned U.S. House seats as at-large districts—covering 
the entire state. 
Failure to adjust district boundaries to satisfy a 
principle of population equality was met with growing 
resistance among those constituents residing in more 
populous metropolitan settings, and in 1946 the Su-
preme Court addressed the issue of district malappor-
tionment. In the famous 4-to-3 decision handed down 
by Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green, the Su-
preme Court chose not to wade into the “political 
thicket” of setting the criteria for crafting legislative 
districts. The ruling in this case was not, of course, the 
last word, and in the 1962 Baker v. Carr decision not 
only did the Court deem redistricting a justiciable issue 
but also endorsed a principle of apportionment based 
on the criterion that each person deserved an equal 
vote (Levinson, 1985). Hence the principle of one per-
son, one vote was established. 
On its face, the notion and conception of the one 
person, one vote principle seems straightforward and 
hardly controversial—much like “total population”. 
Court rulings and scholarly opinions, however, have 
here too injected considerable nuance and complexity 
as to what this tenet actually means in reconfiguring 
these districts following the decennial Census and 
subsequent apportionment. If we merely take the 
principle at its word, for example, we might expect 
that equal representation demands a remarkably pre-
cise distribution of voters—indeed, such that an equal 
number of voters populate each district in any state 
that contains enough residents to warrant multiple 
districts. But from this seemingly simplistic interpreta-
tion the matter is complicated by two realities, one 
legal and the other empirical.  
First, legal precedent has never held that redistrict-
ing in accordance with the one person, one vote prin-
ciple should be tied to anything other than some 
definition of total population—regardless of how many 
actual voters are present. No finer differentiation of 
the defined total population—such as, based on age, 
citizenship, or any other criterion—has become the 
default standard in determining congressional redis-
tricting. Yet, the Court has allowed, in a few particular 
cases, districting arrangements that are performed on 
the basis of a finer measure of voter equality than 
simple total population. For example, in the 1966 case 
of Burns v. Richardson the Court agreed “that a juris-
diction could satisfy one-person, one-vote by drawing 
districts…[with] equal numbers of registered voters” 
(quoted in Persily, 2011). 
Despite opening this legal possibility, in the ruling 
of the 2011 case of Lepak v. City of Irving, which the 
Supreme Court declined to hear, the Fifth Circuit Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals refused to overturn the 
reapportionment plan for the city council districts even 
though the one majority Hispanic district was approxi-
mately equal to its counterparts with respect to total 
population but almost half as large if the measure is 
based on the citizen voting age population. This north 
Texas municipality is an instance where the one per-
son, one vote principleas typically interpretedis 
upheld, while itas literally interpretedappears to 
be violated. In other words, Irving, Texas achieved total 
population equality among its districts while undermin-
ing voter equality. Its actions may empower a minority 
population, but it does so, ironically, at the expense of 
diluting the votes of the majority segment of Anglo 
residents. Hence, on the most basic level, there seems 
to be some tension between the Court’s jurisprudence 
and possible interpretations of the classic democratic 
principle of one person, one vote. 
This ties directly into the second issue that the one 
person, one vote principle must contend. Not only do 
finer measures of voter equality entangle the legal 
profession in debates about salient tradeoffs regard-
ing, for instance, minority representation, but the Cen-
sus is also not currently administered and designed in 
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such a manner that it can adequately extract reliable 
data on voter eligibility or citizenship at finer levels of 
political geography, including congressional districts 
(Persily, 2011)2. Thus, if we again take the notion of 
one person, one vote in its most literal sense and de-
sire the redistribution of voters in geographic settings 
so that these boundaries contain the same number of 
eligible voters or citizens, we cannot, at least at this 
time, perform such a task because the data are not 
there.  
Beyond the issues with legal precedents and empir-
ical limitations, we should also state the commonly 
understood reality that a Census count constitutes no 
more than a static picture of the population conducted 
over a very short span of time. In other words, even if 
we are confident in the Census count of the American 
population (admittedly this is a big “if”), it is of course 
dynamic—with tremendous variation in residential 
mobility, incarceration rates, birth rates, death rates, 
migration, and all of these components varying by 
differences in the demography of any given locality. 
This reality obviously also serves to undermine any 
attempt to meet the one person, one vote principle. In 
other words, the moment the Census is completed, it is 
outdated.  
It is then, at least, a curiosity that the Court has 
used the slogan of “one person, one vote” to label 
their position first established in Baker v. Carr (1962) 
and reinforced since the 1960s. But, there are reasons 
to think that it could be more than just a curiosity. 
There are creditable arguments that a standard nar-
rower than total populationand more closely aligned 
with the number of actual votersbetter models some 
democratic norms (Fishkin, 2012).3 And, there is some 
legal precedence for these prescriptions as well. For 
                                                             
2 In the same article, Persily explains the shortcomings of Census data on 
the number of citizens in a given locality at lower levels of geographic 
aggregation. For one, the Census data for congressional redistricting do 
not indicate citizenship and, in order to make estimates at the congres-
sional district level requires use of American Community Survey (ACS) 
data, which is not reliable because the surveys are not representative of 
constituents residing in America’s 435 U.S. House districts. So, with 
regard to considering estimates of, for example, the Latino citizen voting 
age population (CVAP), Persily concludes that “the only relevant citizen-
ship data available from the census gives ballpark figures, at best, and 
misleading and confusing estimates at worst” (p. 776). 
3 Explicitly, we mean that one person who is able to vote (eligible) should 
have a commensurate influence (weight) given to their vote in District X 
as the weight afforded another eligible voter situated in District Y. Admit-
tedly, the proposition that a single voter has much (if any) influence on 
affecting who represents them is miniscule to the point of approximating 
zero and hence it is really a matter of the aggregation of eligible voters in 
any two districts in a given state being as equal as possible. For an inter-
esting critique of the notion that votes for individuals should essentially 
carry the same weight see Fishkin (2012). Fishkin recognizes that with the 
vast expansion of the eligible electorate, the courts have moved away 
from defending the principle of virtual representation (that minors and 
others ineligible to vote deserve equal representation) and decidedly in 
favor of a one person, one vote standard predicated on the population of 
eligible voters. 
example, the Voting Rights Act defines majority-
minority districts by VAP, not total population.  
To be clear, congressional apportionment and re-
districting are two distinct processes with largely dis-
tinct legal foundations, but they do share similar 
normative and empirical goals and use similar data to 
try to achieve them. The use of total population in 
congressional apportionment is constitutionally codified 
by the 14th Amendment, though its definition has histori-
cally been somewhat malleable. Once each state is 
notified of the number of congressional districts it has 
been apportioned for the next decade, it is required by 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court to construct its 
districts in accordance with the one person, one vote 
principle—that is, each district is to have “as mathe-
matically equal as reasonably possible” the same por-
tion of the state’s total population (quoted in White v. 
Weiser, 1973). 
Although the redistricting total population can have 
the same intertemporal malleability as the apportion-
ment total population, there are currently also slight 
differences between them (e.g., the overseas popula-
tions are excluded from the former). Nonetheless, both 
processes rest on a similar normative and constitution-
al understanding. Intrastate congressional redistricting 
was brought under the one person, one vote principle 
in the 1964 Wesberry v. Sanders decision: “the com-
mand of Art. I, 2, that Representatives be chosen ‘by 
the People of the several States’ means that as nearly 
as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional 
election is to be worth as much as another’s”. And, the 
Court, in Department of Commerce v. Montana (1992), 
tentatively connected this same principle to interstate 
congressional apportionment: “there is some force to 
the argument that the same historical insights that 
informed our construction of Article I, 2, in the context 
of intrastate districting should apply here as well. As 
we interpreted the constitutional command that Rep-
resentatives be chosen ‘by the People of the several 
States’ to require the State to pursue equality in repre-
sentation, we might well find that the requirement 
that Representatives be apportioned among the sever-
al States ‘according to their respective Numbers’ would 
also embody the same principle of equality”. 
All of the above normative, legal, definitional, and 
empirical interconnections between and variations 
within congressional apportionment and redistricting 
continue to leave open the possibility—as slight as it 
may be—that the application of the democratic and 
constitutional principle of one person, one vote could 
continue to be challenged and maybe even augmented 
for one or both of them in the future. To better under-
stand some of the possible empirical consequences, 
the remainder of this article agnostically explores—
with the best available data, some of which is unfortu-
nately limited—the recent history of U.S. congressional 
apportionment and redistricting (1972–2012). We 
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compare and contrast the current legal standard of 
total population with the implications of applying a 
more literal definition of one person, one vote—
specifically the use of voting age population and voting 
eligible population to assess the degree of intrastate 
and interstate malapportionment in American politics. 
3. The Reapportionment Revolutions 
In this section we discuss the historical and political 
contexts that shaped the legal arguments propping up 
the two major pillars guiding contemporary congres-
sional redistricting: equal population and safeguards 
for minority voting rights.  
Scholars speak of Baker v. Carr as initiating a revo-
lution (Cox & Katz, 2002; Fenno, 1978), because of its 
wide reaching effects on district-based elections. The 
reassignment of residents on the basis of equal popula-
tion clearly could and would, alter the outcomes of 
elections both in terms of the incumbency advantage 
(Desposato & Petrocik, 2003) and partisan control 
(McKee, 2008). But this was not the only reapportion-
ment revolution. Thirty years after Baker v. Carr, with 
the equal population rule firmly in place, the second 
reapportionment revolution occurred with the massive 
increase in the number of majority-minority districts 
created for the 1992 congressional elections (McKee, 
2004). 
The principle guiding the first reapportionment 
revolution was of course technically colorblind, but the 
context surrounding its advocacy had much to do with 
the issue of race (Levinson, 2002). Especially in south-
ern states, congressional district populations variedly 
enormously (Bullock, 2010). This was not by accident, 
rather the historical strength of the Democratic Solid 
South resided in rural counties that often contained 
relatively large, and primarily disfranchised, African 
American populations (Key, 1949). The whites in these 
rural settings knew that readjustment of district 
boundaries on the basis of equal population would 
weaken their hold on political power. Not surprisingly, 
the triumvirate of cases (Baker v. Carr; Reynolds v. 
Sims; and Wesberry v. Sanders) forming the backbone 
of the one person, one vote principle involved lawsuits 
from southern states (Tennessee, Alabama, and Geor-
gia, respectively). Redrawing district lines to better suit 
the one person, one vote principle would eventually 
bolster the clout of African Americans (Bullock & Gad-
die, 2009) and whites residing in burgeoning metropol-
itan areas (Black & Black, 2002). 
Enforcement of the equal population standard as 
espoused in Baker, centered on the simple counting of 
the number of people residing in a given district. As we 
will demonstrate, compliance with this standard has 
increased with every subsequent reapportionment in 
response to essentially a zero-tolerance policy laid out 
by the Supreme Court in Karcher v. Daggett (1983). In 
this case the Court ruled that even miniscule deviations 
from equal total population violated the Constitution 
because the state of New Jersey could clearly comply 
with implementing a plan with more equal district 
populations. Specifically, the population difference 
between the largest and smallest congressional district 
in New Jersey was 3,674 individuals, which was just 
0.7% of the state’s ideal district size. 
With practically no justifiable wiggle room from the 
equal total population standard established by the 
Court in Karcher, the question of minority vote dilution 
reemerged in the 1986 case of Thornburg v. Gingles. 
Responding to a history of southern apportionment and 
districting schemes that were devised to weaken the 
likelihood that African Americans would have the op-
portunity to elect candidates of their choice (Davidson, 
1984; Parker, 1990), in Thornburg v. Gingles4 the Su-
preme Court laid out a set of criteria, that if met, 
would allow for the creation of districts controlled by 
minority populations (for details see Butler, 2002; 
McKee and Shaw, 2005). Because of the timing of the 
decision, the 1992 U.S. House elections would be the 
first to occur with a large expansion in the number of 
newly created majority-minority districts. 
Table 1 displays data on the number of majority 
black and majority Hispanic congressional districts—
legally defined by a district’s voting age population—
from 1972 to 2012. Whereas there were eight majority 
black districts in 1972 and twelve in 1982, in the wake 
of the Thornburg decision the number increased to 27 
in 1992. Most of the new majority black districts were 
located in southern states covered by the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act (VRA). Under the Preclearance Provision in 
Section 5 of the VRA, the Department of Justice over-
saw redistricting plans, and during the 1990s round it 
insisted that certain southern states maximize their 
number of majority black districts (Bullock, 2010; But-
ler, 2002). In 2002 the total is reduced to 21, but went 
up to 24 in 2012. The decline in the total number of 
majority black districts since 1992 is partly due to 
slower population growth among the African American 
population vis-à-vis other minority groups (especially 
compared to Asians and Latinos) and also a response 
to the Shaw v. Reno (1993) decision and subsequent 
rulings (e.g., Miller v. Johnson 1995; Bush v. Vera 1996; 
Hunt v. Cromartie 2001) that declared several majority 
black districts unconstitutional racial gerrymanders 
(Butler, 2002). 
In contrast with majority black districts, the large jump 
in the number of majority Hispanic districts from 1982 (N 
= 6) to 1992 (N = 16) is followed by another increase from 
21 in 2002 to 30 by 2012. Also, since 1982, the average 
percent Hispanic VAP (HVAP) increases and it is notably 
higher than the average percent black VAP (BVAP) in 
these years in these majority-minority districts. 
                                                             
4 This was a North Carolina case. 
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Table 1. Majority Black and Majority Hispanic U.S. House Districts, 1972 to 2002. 
Statistics 1972 1982 1992 2002 2012 
Majority Black Districts 
     
Average BVAP 66% 66% 59% 57% 54% 
Median BVAP 62 66 58 57 54 
Maximum BVAP 86 90 72 63 61 
Minimum BVAP 58 51 50 51 50 
Range 28 39 22 12 11 
Standard Deviation 10 11 6 3 4 
N 8 12 27 21 24 
      
Majority Hispanic Districts 
     
Average HVAP 60% 57% 61% 64% 64% 
Median HVAP 60 56 58 64 61 
Maximum HVAP 69 66 79 75 82 
Minimum HVAP 52 50 53 52 50 
Range 17 16 26 23 32 
Standard Deviation 12 5 7 7 9 
N 2 6 16 21 30 
Note: Data calculated by the authors from the U.S. Census Bureau. The 2012 results were computed from the data made available by 
Stephen Wolf as posted on the Daily Kos website: www.dailykos.com/story/2013/04/08/1200099/-113th-Congress-Guide-w-
Demography-Pronunciation-08-12-Pres-12-House-06-12-Downballot-by-CD
Furthermore, the maximum, range, and standard devi-
ations of the HVAP remain much higher than the corre-
sponding BVAP statistics for majority black districts. 
One obvious explanation for the differences is that 
Hispanic populations have much higher rates of non-
citizen voting age populations.  
Against the backdrop of the equal total population 
rule, the increase in majority-minority districts, as 
numerous studies have documented (Black and Black, 
2002; Lublin, 1997; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Hill, 
1995; Petrocik and Desposato, 1998), necessarily re-
duced the overall number of congressional districts 
won by Democratic candidates. This was because mi-
nority voters, especially African Americans, are the 
most Democratic in their voting preferences and thus 
concentrating them into fewer districts increased the 
portion of Republican voters in adjoining districts. 
The progression of case law squarely rests the met-
ric of the one person, one vote principle on counting 
the total population in a state and then dividing it by 
the assigned number of congressional districts. By 
contrast, the question of apportioning districts where 
minority vote dilution comes into play is an ever-
evolving legal issue. Suffice it to say that it has become 
a highly contentious and partisan-laden dispute be-
cause the concentration of minority populations gen-
erally benefits the Republican Party in congressional 
elections, at least in the aggregate (but see Shotts, 
2001). And given the 2013 ruling in Shelby County v. 
Holder, which threw out the Section 4 criteria used for 
determining Section 5 preclearance under the VRA, it 
remains to be seen what future redistricting plans will 
look like and what, if any, new districting standard may 
be added. 
To be sure, minority vote dilution remains a consti-
tutional violation (as articulated in Thornburg v. Gin-
gles 1986), but by rendering Section 4 of the VRA 
unconstitutional, it is likely that Republican-controlled 
legislatures will now be more inclined to pack minority 
voters (Latinos and African Americans) into fewer dis-
tricts with even higher non-citizen residents and others 
ineligible to vote, especially in the case of Hispanics. A 
switch from districting based on a standard of total 
population to one according to VAP, for instance, 
would likely lessen to some extent, the effectiveness of 
this type of partisan gerrymander. From the vantage of 
Democrats seeking an electoral advantage, expect the 
persistence of intra-party disputes between minorities 
(blacks and Hispanics) and Anglos. Some minority 
Democrats will insist on protecting racially descriptive 
representation through the maintenance and further 
creation of majority-minority districts, whereas Anglo 
Democrats will advocate for less concentration of mi-
nority populations so their more equally distributed 
presence across multiple districts enhances the aggre-
gate win/loss record of Democrats in U.S. House races. 
Changing from a total population standard to VAP 
would, perhaps, make Democrats even more attentive 
to the common tradeoff between minority representa-
tion and partisan competitiveness.  
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4. Empirical Assessments of the One Person,  
One Vote Principle  
We first seek to determine the extent to which con-
gressional districts that are redistricted on the total 
population standard of the one person, one vote 
principle approximate equality when viewed by other 
standards. 
Specifically, we begin with an analysis that shows 
just how much variability exists between measures of 
equal district total population versus one based on 
the district voting age population. The disparities are 
notable because the VAP standard gets us, arguably, 
closer to the literal one person, one vote ideal, which, 
as in the Wesberry decision, intends that “one man’s 
[sic] vote in a congressional election is to be worth as 
much as another’s”. This, then, raises questions about 
the constitutionality between the goals and the 
means of democratic equality as pronounced by the 
Court. 
Second, we demonstrate what the reapportion-
ment of House seats would look like if it were based 
on the VAP and the VEP, instead of total population, 
what the resulting malapportionment is for each, and 
what the implications would be for the partisan allo-
cation of Electoral Votes in presidential contests. 
5. Intrastate Deviations 
Beginning with Wesberry and continuing through 
current jurisprudence, the Court has insisted that U.S. 
House districts within a state be drawn, as mathemat-
ically as possible, with equal populations. This consti-
tutional requirement has become increasingly refined 
since the 1960s equality revolution, because (1) the 
U.S. Census has provided considerably more micro-
level data and (2) these data work in conjunction with 
advances in computer software technologies that 
employ Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to map 
populations. Today, the constitutional principle of 
population equality is interpreted for most states5 to 
mean that a state’s congressional districts should not 
deviate in their apportionment population by more 
than a single person.6 
Table 2 documents the increasing precision with 
which one-person, one-votebased on the total 
population standardhas been applied. In 1972, the 
first reapportionment and redistricting after Wesber-
ry, 62.3% of congressional House districts deviated 
from their state’s ideal district population by less than 
                                                             
5 Iowa is a notable exception. Iowa passed a state constitutional amend-
ment requiring their U.S. House districts to contain whole counties as 
long as the population deviations are not greater than 1%. The maximum 
deviation in Iowa’s post-2010 districts was 76 individuals. 
6 This deviation is allowed when a state’s apportioned population is not 
perfectly divisible by the number of congressional districts allocated to 
the state. 
0.25% and the average deviation for all House dis-
tricts was 3.88%. Yet, in 1972, there were still 8.81% 
of districts that deviated by 1% or more from this 
standard and a maximum deviation of 7.34%. As the 
Court continued to press for greater and greater 
equality, the rates and size of deviation dropped pre-
cipitously. After the 2012 reapportionment, 99.07% 
of all House districts were within 0.25% of their 
state’s ideal populations. In fact, the average devia-
tion for all House districts was just 0.01%; the maxi-
mum deviation was just 0.94%. 
For several reasons, the one-person, one-vote 
revolution has been a tremendous success. It elimi-
nated the democratically corrupting practice of “si-
lent gerrymandering” that allowed for increasingly 
rotten districts to proliferate as well as the partisan 
advantages that they engendered. It avoided the 
“political thicket”, of which Justice Frankfurter was so 
fearful of in Colegrove v. Green (1946), by reengaging 
the political practice of redistricting. And, it reduced 
the deviation in apportionment populations in states’ 
House districts to nearly zero. 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, in fact, wrote in his 
Memoirs that the seminal Baker decision was the 
most important decision in his entire tenure on the 
Courtmore so than, for instance, Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954), Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), or 
Miranda v. Arizona (1966). In summing these accom-
plishments, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2008) con-
clude that American democracy is entering an “age of 
fairness” and the end of inequality.  
Table 2 clearly demonstrates that inequality is 
nearly vanquishedat least as measured by the total 
number of individuals in the congressional districts 
for each state. Nonetheless, this measure does not 
easily equate to the constitutional principle of one 
person, one vote. As Levinson (2002) argues, this 
principle “most certainly does not hold true either as 
a description of the electorate or even as a normative 
guide to deciding which persons should be awarded 
the franchise and what weight their votes should 
actually have in the electoral process.” 
In other words and in the most basic interpreta-
tion, the numerical count for the standard—the total 
population as defined—includes many “persons” who 
cannot vote, for instance, individuals below the age of 
18, individuals who are not U.S. citizens, and many 
felons. This is considerably more than just a semantic 
concernin other words, perhaps “one person, one 
vote” may be more than just a poor choice of words. 
The constitutional and normative underpinnings of 
the principle are central to the efficacy of a democra-
cy: equality and the right to vote. Levinson concludes 
by arguing that the constitutional principle of one 
person, one vote is a democratic mantra in need of a 
meaning. 
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Table 2. Increasing Precision of the Equal Population Requirement, 1972-2012. 
Percent Deviation from State 
Average District Population 
1972 1982 1992 2002 2012 
(93rd Congress) (98th Congress) (103rd Congress) (108th Congress) (113th Congress) 
Districts with Deviations of… 
     Less than 0.25 percent 62.38% 77.18% 97.18% 98.59% 99.07% 
0.25 to 0.5 percent 16.9 12.24 2.82 1.17 0.23 
0.5 to 1 percent 11.9 7.53 -- 0.23 0.7 
1 to 5 percent 8.57 3.06 -- -- -- 
5 percent or more 0.24 -- -- -- -- 
Average % deviation 3.88% 1.93% 0.36% 0.01% 0.01% 
Maximum % deviation below  -4.81 -1.47 -0.46 -0.34 -0.67 
Maximum % deviation above 
ideal population 7.34 1.65 0.47 0.66 0.94 
N 420 425 426 426 428 
Note: Data include all districts except those that were either at-large or in states that did not redistrict for the relevant election: 
1972: at-large states were AK, DE, NV, ND, VT, and WY; HI (N=2), ME (N=2), NE (N=3), and NM (N=2) did not redistrict for the 1972 
elections. 1982: at-large states were AK, DE, ND, SD, VT, and WY; ME (N=2) and MT (N=2) did not redistrict for the 1982 elections. 
1992 and 2002: at-large states were AK, DE, MT, ND, SD, VT, and WY; ME (N=2) did not redistrict for the 1992 and 2002 elections. 
2012: at-large states were AK, DE, MT, ND, SD, VT, and WY. 
Table 3. Variations in Voting Age Populations, 1972-2012. 
Percent Deviation from State 
Average District VAP 
1972 1982 1992 2002 2012 
(93rd Congress) (98th Congress) (103rd Congress) (108th Congress) (113th Congress) 
Districts with Deviations of… 
     Less than 0.25 percent 4.76% 6.35% 6.10% 10.80% 7.94% 
0.25 to 0.5 percent 3.81 7.29 8.45 9.39 8.18 
0.5 to 1 percent 10.24 12.47 15.96 14.55 16.36 
1 to 5 percent 58.33 59.53 55.87 51.64 56.54 
5 percent or more 22.86 14.35 13.62 13.62 10.98 
Average % deviation 3.53% 2.69% 2.58% 2.39% 2.26% 
Maximum % deviation below  -16.38 -13.26 -13.04 -13.06 -10.34 
Maximum % deviation above 
ideal population 26.77 17.4 17.31 17.96 16.17 
Average VAP % 65.61% 71.87% 74.43% 74.31% 75.95% 
Minimum VAP % 57.31 60.05 62.29 63.38 66.81 
Maximum VAP % 86.02 86.05 88.91 86.75 88.62 
N 420 425 426 426 428 
Note: Data include all districts except those that were either at-large or in states that did not redistrict for the relevant election: 1972: at-
large states were AK, DE, NV, ND, VT, and WY; HI (N=2), ME (N=2), NE (N=3), and NM (N=2) did not redistrict for the 1972 elections. 1982: at-
large states were AK, DE, ND, SD, VT, and WY; ME (N=2) and MT (N=2) did not redistrict for the 1982 elections. 1992 and 2002: at-large 
states were AK, DE, MT, ND, SD, VT, and WY; ME (N=2) did not redistrict for the 1992 and 2002 elections. 2012: at-large states were AK, DE, 
MT, ND, SD, VT, and WY. 
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Table 3 taps into this concern with the most straight-
forward data available for congressional districts: voting 
age population (VAP). Table 3 provides a similar break-
down of states’ districts as Table 2, but now with the 
VAP as the measurement. In 1972, just 4.76% of House 
districts were within 0.25% of their state’s ideal VAP.7 
Furthermore, 81.19% of the districts had VAPs that 
deviated by 1.0% or more from their state’s ideal VAP, 
of which 22.86% deviated by 5% or more. The greatest 
deviation in 1972 was 26.77%. 
The deviations in Table 2 are greatest in 1972, but 
the total population deviations were still considerably 
smaller than these corresponding VAP deviations dis-
played in Table 3. In addition, the total population 
deviations were minimized over time, but these VAP 
deviations have not been systematically reduced. 
In 2012, the percent of districts within the 0.25% 
threshold increase, but only to 7.94%compared to 
99.07% for the comparable statistic in Table 2, and 
67.52% of the districts were above the 1% threshold. 
The maximum deviation in 2012 was 16.17%.  
These VAP deviations are considerable and stand in 
sharp contrast with the results from Table 2. Specifical-
ly, instead of witnessing the diminishing deviations in 
total populations over time, variations in states’ district 
VAPs show little change over time as well as a wide 
variation in districts’ VAP. 
Together, these tables suggest that a more literal 
standard of one person, one vote is currently far from 
being met. Despite the strict overall population equal-
ity of districts within states, these figures show that 
some districts are “packed” with more minors who 
cannot vote and some with fewer minorsup to 
more than a 26% difference between districts within 
a state. In districts that are packed with relatively 
more minors, there are fewer remaining potential 
voters as compared to districts with relatively fewer 
minors. This results in the over-representation of the 
former voters and the under-representation of the 
latter voters. 
The presence of demonstrable and predictable var-
iation in the VAP among various societal groups 
including those protected by the VRAproduces, be 
it random or systematic, districts of an unequal num-
ber of potential voters and thus perpetuates vote 
dilution. Baker and subsequent decisions declared 
districts with unequal populations to be unconstitu-
tional; but this standard does not create districts in 
which one potential voter’s vote is equal to another’s. 
Basing redistricting on the VAP, for instance, 
would create its own set of issuesmost obvious 
                                                             
7 Each state is currently required to apportion to the state’s ideal 
population, which is calculated by dividing the state’s apportionment 
population by the number of districts the state will have. The ideal VAP 
is calculated similarly, the state’s total voting age population divided by 
the number of districts the state is allocated. 
being greater total population deviations among dis-
tricts. It would also, in all likelihood, not eliminate 
other measures of intrastate malapportionment. On 
the other hand, VAP-based allocations may arguably 
bring states’ districts in closer compliance with the 
words of “one person, one vote.” 
6. Interstate Deviations 
The above section documented the presence of con-
sistent and considerable intrastate malapportionment 
for VAP at levels far greater than those declared uncon-
stitutional for total population. Intrastate malappor-
tionment, though, is but one form of malapportionment. 
It is the form, however, that is almost exclusively con-
sidered by the Court, politicians, and scholars. Inter-
state malapportionment, though, is the population 
deviation across the states, and as argued in the De-
partment of Commerce v. Montana (1992) case, it very 
well may be susceptible to the same type of constitu-
tional standards, tests, and proscriptions as intrastate 
malapportionment. And, there is plenty of evidence 
that the current levels of interstate malapportionment 
may be constitutionally suspect (Ladewig & Jasinski, 
2008; Ladewig, 2011) (also see Clemens v. Department 
of Commerce 2010). For example, after the 2010 reap-
portionment and the equalization of total populations 
within states (as demonstrated in Table 2), the maxi-
mum deviation in the ideal population sizes among 
House districts across states was still 463,132 individu-
als, which is 65.38% of the national ideal district size. 
This deviation is about 9600% larger than the deviation 
declared unconstitutional in Karcher and over 46 mil-
lion% larger than the typical intrastate deviation al-
lowed today. Paradoxically, the current levels of 
interstate malapportionment persist and grow despite 
the Court’s efforts in minimizing the intrastate malap-
portionment of the total population.  
If the same one person, one vote principle of con-
gressional redistricting also applies to congressional 
apportionment, then a similar critique of which stand-
ard to apply and analyze is also possible. Given that 
only state-level data are necessary for apportionment 
analyses, the data are more extensive. As such, we can 
conduct VAP analyses, similar to that presented in 
Table 3, as well as analyses based on the voting eligible 
population data—which are not available at the district 
level (thus we were not able to analyze intrastate VEP 
malapportionment).  
Given the distribution of House seats after the 2010 
reapportionment, interstate malapportionment as 
measured with the VAP of each state persistssimilar 
to the numbers displayed in the preceding paragraph 
(see Appendix Tables 1 through 5 for details). The max-
imum deviation in states’ ideal VAPs with the current 
apportionment decreases by two-hundredths of a 
percent, to 65.33%, of the national ideal district size. 
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Reapportioning the House with the VAP data, however, 
would have decreased the maximum deviation percent 
to 57.47%. As mentioned, the VAP is still not an entire-
ly accurate enumeration of potential votes—though 
certainly closer to a literal interpretation than total 
populationbecause it includes noncitizens, felons, 
etc. The VEP measure is even closer to the literal inter-
pretation of one person, one vote. And, the 2010 inter-
state malapportionment figures increase substantially if 
VEP is evaluated for each state and its current appor-
tionment. In this case, the maximum deviation in states’ 
ideal VEP jumps to 77.31% of the national ideal district 
size. Furthermore, given the state variations in popula-
tion, eligibility, and the number of House districts, the 
2010 apportionment provides each eligible voter in 
Rhode Island with just about twice the voting power of 
each eligible voter in Montanathe voter equivalency 
ratio. It is difficult to reconcile the current implementa-
tion of “one person, one vote” when these variations 
create foreseeable results in which “one Rhode Islander, 
two votes” vis-à-vis a Montanan. 
Amending the Constitution to apportion on potential 
voters, either with the VAP or the VEP, would also have 
deep implications for reapportionment. Tables 4 
through 8 provide the number of House seats that each 
state would receive in each reapportionment from 1970 
to 20108 as well as the number of seat changes among 
the three population measures: Apportionment Popula-
tion (AP)which is currently used, VAP, and VEP9 (see 
Appendix Tables 6 through 10 for population details). 
Specifically, in 1970 if the U.S. House had been appor-
tioned with VAP instead of AP, 10 House seats would 
have been changed: five states (CT, NJ, NY, OR, and PA) 
would have gained seats and five states (LA, MI, SC, SD, 
and TX) would have lost one seat. In 1980, there is a 6-
seat difference between AP and VAP, a 10-seat differ-
ence between AP and VEP, and a 10-seat difference 
between VAP and VEP. Overall, the apportionment of 11 
states is affected by which measure is used (AP, VAP, or 
VEP) to approximate the one person, one vote standard. 
The question of which population standard to use 
becomes even more consequential starting with the 
1990 reapportionment. For the 1990 reapportionment, 
there would have been 10 seat changes if VAP were 
used instead of AP, 18 seat changes if VEP would have 
been used instead of AP, and 18 seat changes if VEP 
would have been used instead of VAP. Overall, the 
population used affects the apportionment of 17 states. 
And, for the 2000 reapportionment, there would have 
been 6 seat changes if VAP were used instead of AP, 40 
                                                             
8 The Hill Method of Equal Proportions was used to apportion the 
435-seat U.S. House. See U.S. Code 2 Section 2a. 
9 The AP and VAP data are from the U.S. Census Bureau. The VEP 
data are from the Public Mapping Project (see www.publicmapping.org). 
Unfortunately, the Public Mapping Project does not have VEP for 
1970. 
seat changes if VEP were used instead of AP, and 36 seat 
changes if VEP would have been used instead of VAP. 
Finally, for the 2010 reapportionment, there would have 
been 10 seat changes if VAP were used instead of AP, 26 
seat changes if VEP were used instead of AP, and 22 seat 
changes if VEP would have been used instead of VAP. 
Overall, the population standard used affects the appor-
tionment across these decades for 34 statesand, 
some quite dramatically. For example, in 2000 California 
has a high of 53 seats (AP) and a low of 45 seats (VEP). 
Changing the population used for the apportionment 
from, say, AP to VAP or VEP would arguably bring the 
practice of apportionment closer in line with the literal 
meaning of “one person, one vote”. It also would have 
brought it numerically closer—though, there is no guar-
antee that this would persist for future apportionments. 
In 2010, if the VEP was used as the apportionment 
population (resulting in the district distribution found in 
Table 8), the interstate malapportionment measure-
ment of the maximum deviation percent (the most 
commonly used statistic by the Supreme Court to assess 
intrastate malapportionment) in states’ ideal VEP would 
drop to 55.20% of the national ideal district size (see 
Appendix Table 5 for details). Any change would also 
have numerous effects in the U.S. Congress and state 
politics. But, one of the most direct effects would be on 
the President through the Electoral College. 
Table 9 displays the Electoral College vote as it was 
with the actual Apportionment Population from 1972 
through 2012 and recalculates the vote if the House had 
been reapportioned with VAP or VEP. If VAP had been 
used, the vote would have changed in more than half of 
the eleven Presidential elections. Even though five of the 
six instances in which a vote change occurred, the same 
President would have been elected, the 2000 Presiden-
tial election would have ended in a 268 to 269 split.10 
This split gives neither Republican George W. Bush nor 
Democrat Al Gore an absolute majority of 270 Electoral 
College votes to win the Presidency. In this case, the 
2000 presidential election would have been decided in 
the U.S. House of Representatives. If the VEP had been 
the population measure, then four of the eight presiden-
tial elections for which we have data would have wit-
nessed a change in the Electoral College vote, but none 
of the outcomesincluding the 2000 electionwould 
have changed. Nonetheless, the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives and the Electoral College would arguably 
have more closely reflected the literal interpretation of 
the democratic norm enshrined in the constitutional 
principle of one person, one vote. 
                                                             
10 Gore’s count omits the faithless elector from Washington, D.C. who 
abstained from the actual 2000 Electoral College vote. However, given 
the VAP results, she probably would have cast her ballot—thereby 
giving Gore 269 Electoral Votes. Either way, the absolute majority of 
270 votes would not have been garnered by either presidential candi-
date. 
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Table 4. Apportionment in 1972 by Different Population Measures. 








Alabama 7 7 0 0 
Alaska 1 1 0 0 
Arizona 4 4 0 0 
Arkansas 4 4 0 0 
California 43 43 0 0 
Colorado 5 5 0 0 
Connecticut 6 7 1 1 
Delaware 1 1 0 0 
Florida 15 15 0 0 
Georgia 10 10 0 0 
Hawaii 2 2 0 0 
Idaho 2 2 0 0 
Illinois 24 24 0 0 
Indiana 11 11 0 0 
Iowa 6 6 0 0 
Kansas 5 5 0 0 
Kentucky 7 7 0 0 
Louisiana 8 7 -1 1 
Maine 2 2 0 0 
Maryland 8 8 0 0 
Massachusetts 12 12 0 0 
Michigan 19 18 -1 1 
Minnesota 8 8 0 0 
Mississippi 5 5 0 0 
Missouri 10 10 0 0 
Montana 2 2 0 0 
Nebraska 3 3 0 0 
Nevada 1 1 0 0 
New Hampshire 2 2 0 0 
New Jersey 15 16 1 1 
New Mexico 2 2 0 0 
New York 39 40 1 1 
North Carolina 11 11 0 0 
North Dakota 1 1 0 0 
Ohio 23 23 0 0 
Oklahoma 6 6 0 0 
Oregon 4 5 1 1 
Pennsylvania 25 26 1 1 
Rhode Island 2 2 0 0 
South Carolina 6 5 -1 1 
South Dakota 2 1 -1 1 
Tennessee 8 8 0 0 
Texas 24 23 -1 1 
Utah 2 2 0 0 
Vermont 1 1 0 0 
Virginia 10 10 0 0 
Washington 7 7 0 0 
West Virginia 4 4 0 0 
Wisconsin 9 9 0 0 
Wyoming 1 1 0 0 
Total 435 435 0 10 
Note: shaded states experience a change in one of the three 
change measures. AP: Apportionment Population; VAP: Voting Age 
Population. 1. Change of VAP – AP. 
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Alabama 7 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alaska 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arkansas 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
California 45 46 43 1 1 -2 2 -3 3 
Colorado 6 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Connecticut 6 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Delaware 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 19 20 19 1 1 0 0 -1 1 
Georgia 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hawaii 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Idaho 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Illinois 22 22 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indiana 10 10 11 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Iowa 6 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 7 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Louisiana 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maine 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maryland 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Massachusetts 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Michigan 18 17 18 -1 1 0 0 1 1 
Minnesota 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Missouri 9 10 10 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Montana 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nebraska 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nevada 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Hampshire 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Jersey 14 14 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Mexico 3 2 2 -1 1 -1 1 0 0 
New York 34 34 33 0 0 -1 1 -1 1 
North Carolina 11 11 12 0 0 1 1 1 1 
North Dakota 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 21 21 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oklahoma 6 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oregon 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pennsylvania 23 23 24 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Rhode Island 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Carolina 6 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Dakota 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tennessee 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas 27 26 26 -1 1 -1 1 0 0 
Utah 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vermont 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virginia 10 10 11 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Washington 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
West Virginia 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wisconsin 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals 435 435 435 0 6 0 10 0 10 
Note: Shaded states experience a change in one of the three change measures. AP: Apportionment Population; VAP: Voting Age 
Population; VEP: Voting Eligible Population. 1. Change of VAP – AP; 2. Change of VEP – AP; 3. Change of VEP – VAP. 
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Alabama 7 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alaska 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 6 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arkansas 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
California 52 52 45 0 0 -7 7 -7 7 
Colorado 6 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Connecticut 6 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Delaware 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 23 24 23 1 1 0 0 -1 1 
Georgia 11 11 12 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Hawaii 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Idaho 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Illinois 20 20 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indiana 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iowa 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 6 6 7 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Louisiana 7 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maine 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maryland 8 9 9 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Massachusetts 10 11 11 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Michigan 16 16 17 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Minnesota 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 5 4 5 -1 1 0 0 1 1 
Missouri 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montana 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Nebraska 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nevada 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Hampshire 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Jersey 13 14 14 1 1 1 1 0 0 
New Mexico 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New York 31 32 31 1 1 0 0 -1 1 
North Carolina 12 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North Dakota 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 19 19 20 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Oklahoma 6 5 6 -1 1 0 0 1 1 
Oregon 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pennsylvania 21 21 22 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Rhode Island 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Carolina 6 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Dakota 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tennessee 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas 30 29 28 -1 1 -2 2 -1 1 
Utah 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vermont 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virginia 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Washington 9 8 9 -1 1 0 0 1 1 
West Virginia 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wisconsin 9 8 9 -1 1 0 0 1 1 
Wyoming 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 435 435 435 0 10 0 18 0 18 
Note: shaded states experience a change in one of the three change measures. AP: Apportionment Population; VAP: Voting Age 
Population; VEP: Voting Eligible Population. 1. Change of VAP – AP; 2. Change of VEP – AP; 3. Change of VEP – VAP. 
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Alabama 7 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alaska 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 8 8 6 0 0 -2 2 -2 2 
Arkansas 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
California 53 51 45 -2 2 -8 8 -6 6 
Colorado 7 7 6 0 0 -1 1 -1 1 
Connecticut 5 5 6 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Delaware 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 25 26 23 1 1 -2 2 -3 3 
Georgia 13 13 12 0 0 -1 1 -1 1 
Hawaii 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Idaho 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Illinois 19 19 20 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Indiana 9 9 10 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Iowa 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 6 6 7 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Louisiana 7 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maine 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maryland 8 8 9 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Massachusetts 10 10 11 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Michigan 15 15 17 0 0 2 2 2 2 
Minnesota 8 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 4 4 5 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Missouri 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montana 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Nebraska 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nevada 3 3 2 0 0 -1 1 -1 1 
New Hampshire 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Jersey 13 13 14 0 0 1 1 1 1 
New Mexico 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New York 29 30 31 1 1 2 2 1 1 
North Carolina 13 13 12 0 0 -1 1 -1 1 
North Dakota 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 18 18 20 0 0 2 2 2 2 
Oklahoma 5 5 6 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Oregon 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pennsylvania 19 20 22 1 1 3 3 2 2 
Rhode Island 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Carolina 6 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Dakota 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tennessee 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas 32 31 28 -1 1 -4 4 -3 3 
Utah 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vermont 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virginia 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Washington 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
West Virginia 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wisconsin 8 8 9 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Wyoming 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 435 435 435 0 6 0 40 0 36 
Note: shaded states experience a change in one of the three change measures. AP: Apportionment Population; VAP: Voting Age 
Population; VEP: Voting Eligible Population. 1. Change of VAP – AP; 2. Change of VEP – AP; 3. Change of VEP – VAP. 
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Alabama  7 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alaska  1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona  9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arkansas  4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
California  53 52 47 -1 1 -6 6 -5 5 
Colorado  7 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Connecticut  5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Delaware  1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida  27 27 26 0 0 -1 1 -1 1 
Georgia  14 13 13 -1 1 -1 1 0 0 
Hawaii  2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Idaho  2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Illinois  18 18 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indiana  9 9 10 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Iowa  4 4 5 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Kansas  4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky  6 6 7 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Louisiana  6 6 7 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Maine  2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maryland  8 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Massachusetts  9 10 10 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Michigan  14 14 15 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Minnesota  8 7 8 -1 1 0 0 1 1 
Mississippi  4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Missouri  8 8 9 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Montana  1 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Nebraska  3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nevada  4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Hampshire  2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Jersey  12 13 12 1 1 0 0 -1 1 
New Mexico  3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New York  27 28 27 1 1 0 0 -1 1 
North Carolina  13 13 14 0 0 1 1 1 1 
North Dakota  1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio  16 16 17 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Oklahoma  5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oregon  5 6 6 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Pennsylvania  18 18 19 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Rhode Island  2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Carolina  7 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Dakota  1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tennessee  9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas  36 34 31 -2 2 -5 5 -3 3 
Utah  4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vermont  1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virginia  11 11 12 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Washington  10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
West Virginia  3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wisconsin  8 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming  1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 435 435 435 0 10 0 26 0 22 
Note: shaded states experience a change in one of the three change measures. AP: Apportionment Population; VAP: Voting Age 
Population; VEP: Voting Eligible Population. 1. Change of VAP – AP; 2. Change of VEP – AP; 3. Change of VEP – VAP. 
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Table 9. The Electoral College Vote Based on Three Different Measures of Reapportioned State Population, 1972–2008. 
Measure 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Apportioned Population 
           
Democratic Votes 17 297 49 13 111 370 379 266 251 365 332 
Republican Votes 520 240 489 525 426 168 159 271 286 173 206 
Winner R D R R R D D R R D D 
Voting Age Population 
           Democratic Votes 17 296 49 13 111 372 382 268 251 366 334 
Republican Votes 520 241 489 525 426 166 156 269 286 172 204 
Winner R D R R R D D Neither R D D 
Voting Eligible Population 
           Democratic Votes -- -- -- 13 111 372 379 264 256 368 332 
Republican Votes -- -- -- 525 426 166 159 273 281 170 206 
Winner -- -- -- R R D D R R D D 
Note: Data on Electoral Vote returns from 1972-2004 are from CQ’s Guide to U.S. Elections (2005) and the 2008 returns are from 
Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/). Shaded vote returns indicate a different distribution 
or result than the official returns based on the apportioned population. According to a reapportionment based on the VAP, in 2000 
there would not have been an outright winner since both Bush and Gore would not have secured a 270-vote majority. Hence, the 
2000 contest would have been decided in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
7. Conclusion 
In this study we have taken empirical inventory of the 
one person, one vote principle in congressional reap-
portionment and redistricting. The established legal 
precedent for intrastate redistricting relies on minimiz-
ing deviations away from a measure of total popula-
tion. To be sure, in states with multiple districts, they 
now exhibit hardly any deviation from the equal total 
population standard. But the current equal total popu-
lation standard is not the only possible one. Instead, 
other standards are possible, and some of these (such 
as VAP or VEP) arguably more closely reflect the literal 
interpretation of the democratic norm and constitu-
tional principle of “one-person, one-vote”. We have 
also shown that the current use of total population and 
its intrastate equalization has not led concomitantly to 
similar equalizations in the variance of voting age pop-
ulations (VAPs). This is an important finding in and of 
itself. The Court should be clear in what it means by its 
continued usage of the “one-person, one-vote” princi-
ple. The different measures that are employed and can 
be inferred from the principle are far from commensu-
rate. 
In addition to finding that intrastate deviations in 
the VAP have not been systematically reduced in re-
cent congressional redistrictings, we also demonstrate 
that measures of state populations that are more 
closely aligned with actual voters would considerably 
alter decennial reapportionments. For instance, if we 
were to reallocate U.S. House seats on the basis of the 
VAP or the VEP, two measures that afford actual voters 
a more “equally weighted” vote, then there would be 
substantial changes in the redistribution of congres-
sional districts. Further, the differences in seat alloca-
tions based on the different population standards have 
grown in more recent cycles because many of the high 
population growth states contain demographic groups 
with lower citizenship rates and lower VAPs (e.g., His-
panic growth in Arizona and Texas). This means that 
certain slow growth northern states (e.g., New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania) with higher VAPs and VEPs are 
shortchanged congressional representation according 
to these alternative standards.  
We have also shown that in several presidential 
elections the two-party Electoral College vote totals 
would be somewhat altered if House seats were reallo-
cated according to an alternative standard, such as 
VAP or VEP. And since the high growth states are gen-
erally located in the Sun Belt where the GOP is strong-
er but the resident populations are disproportionately 
younger,11 the redistribution of congressional districts 
according to the VAP and VEP would likely ad-
vantageat least in the near termthe Democratic 
Party since it is electorally stronger in low growth 
northern states. In fact, if the 2000 presidential elec-
tion results were based on a congressional reappor-
tionment tied to state voting age population, then 
neither party would have won an Electoral College ma-
joritymeaning the next president would have been 
determined by the U.S. House of Representatives. 
                                                             
11 California is the exception to this rule, a “blue” state with a signifi-
cantly lower voting eligible population. 
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Our findings in this study make it clear that the cur-
rent apportionment and redistricting standard based 
on total population, whether at the district- or state-
level, is but just one possible standard. Furthermore, 
we argue that the definition of “total population” has 
not been constant, complete, or consistent between 
the two processes. As such, other definitions and 
standards are possible, and they may even be more 
consistent with some of our democratic principles. As 
importantly, these other definitions and standards 
produce different resultsthat is, the interpretation 
and explanations of the Court matter significantly in 
practical terms. As for any potential standard closer to 
a literal interpretation of one person, one vote, the 
Census only now is beginning to provide the requisite 
data to analyze the consequences of such a change. 
To be sure, however, any population standard will 
leave us well short in one manner or another of meet-
ing such a lofty and perhaps impractical principle. For 
example, even though the Court has made tremendous 
progress in basically eliminating intrastate malappor-
tionment among U.S. House districts, this equalization 
is largely limited to one defined standard of one per-
son, one vote. Assessing the “equalized” districts on 
other logical and credible standards demonstrates 
much less equality, and thus, leaves a backdoor open 
that could allow line drawers considerable leeway to 
manipulate maps for partisan gain (Winburn, 2008). As 
such, in a matter as central to our democracy as the 
equality of the vote, more reliable and precise data as 
well as much more scholarship and jurisprudence are 
necessary to more fully understand this debatemuch 
less resolve it. 
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tion from Ideal 
% Deviation 
form Ideal 
Alabama 4,779,736 7 682,819 25,557 25,557 3.61% 
Alaska 710,231 1 710,231 -1,854 1,854 -0.26% 
Arizona 6,392,017 9 710,224 -1,848 1,848 -0.26% 
Arkansas 2,915,918 4 728,980 -20,603 20,603 -2.91% 
California 37,253,956 53 702,905 5,472 5,472 0.77% 
Colorado 5,029,196 7 718,457 -10,080 10,080 -1.42% 
Connecticut 3,574,097 5 714,819 -6,443 6,443 -0.91% 
Delaware 897,934 1 897,934 -189,557 189,557 -26.76% 
Florida 18,801,310 27 696,345 12,032 12,032 1.70% 
Georgia 9,687,653 14 691,975 16,401 16,401 2.32% 
Hawaii 1,360,301 2 680,151 28,226 28,226 3.98% 
Idaho 1,567,582 2 783,791 -75,414 75,414 -10.65% 
Illinois 12,830,632 18 712,813 -4,436 4,436 -0.63% 
Indiana 6,483,802 9 720,422 -12,046 12,046 -1.70% 
Iowa 3,046,355 4 761,589 -53,212 53,212 -7.51% 
Kansas 2,853,118 4 713,280 -4,903 4,903 -0.69% 
Kentucky 4,339,367 6 723,228 -14,851 14,851 -2.10% 
Louisiana 4,533,372 6 755,562 -47,185 47,185 -6.66% 
Maine 1,328,361 2 664,181 44,196 44,196 6.24% 
Maryland 5,773,552 8 721,694 -13,317 13,317 -1.88% 
Massachusetts 6,547,629 9 727,514 -19,138 19,138 -2.70% 
Michigan 9,883,640 14 705,974 2,402 2,402 0.34% 
Minnesota 5,303,925 8 662,991 45,386 45,386 6.41% 
Mississippi 2,967,297 4 741,824 -33,448 33,448 -4.72% 
Missouri 5,988,927 8 748,616 -40,239 40,239 -5.68% 
Montana 989,415 1 989,415 -281,038 281,038 -39.67% 
Nebraska 1,826,341 3 608,780 99,596 99,596 14.06% 
Nevada 2,700,551 4 675,138 33,239 33,239 4.69% 
New Hampshire 1,316,470 2 658,235 50,142 50,142 7.08% 
New Jersey 8,791,894 12 732,658 -24,281 24,281 -3.43% 
New Mexico 2,059,179 3 686,393 21,984 21,984 3.10% 
New York 19,378,102 27 717,707 -9,331 9,331 -1.32% 
North Carolina 9,535,483 13 733,499 -25,122 25,122 -3.55% 
North Dakota 672,591 1 672,591 35,786 35,786 5.05% 
Ohio 11,536,504 16 721,032 -12,655 12,655 -1.79% 
Oklahoma 3,751,351 5 750,270 -41,894 41,894 -5.91% 
Oregon 3,831,074 5 766,215 -57,838 57,838 -8.16% 
Pennsylvania 12,702,379 18 705,688 2,689 2,689 0.38% 
Rhode Island 1,052,567 2 526,284 182,093 182,093 25.71% 
South Carolina 4,625,364 7 660,766 47,610 47,610 6.72% 
South Dakota 814,180 1 814,180 -105,803 105,803 -14.94% 
Tennessee 6,346,105 9 705,123 3,254 3,254 0.46% 
Texas 25,145,561 36 698,488 9,889 9,889 1.40% 
Utah 2,763,885 4 690,971 17,405 17,405 2.46% 
Vermont 625,741 1 625,741 82,636 82,636 11.67% 
Virginia 8,001,024 11 727,366 -18,989 18,989 -2.68% 
Washington 6,724,540 10 672,454 35,923 35,923 5.07% 
West Virginia 1,852,994 3 617,665 90,712 90,712 12.81% 
Wisconsin 5,686,986 8 710,873 -2,497 2,497 -0.35% 
Wyoming 563,626 1 563,626 144,751 144,751 20.43% 
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tion from Ideal 
% Deviation 
form Ideal 
Totals 308,143,815 435 708,377 
   Voter Equivalency Ratio 
  
1.88 
   Most Underrepresented 










   
463,132 
  % Max Deviation 
     
65.38%
Mean Absolute Deviation 
    
43,308
 % Mean Abs Deviation 
     
6.11%
 











tion from Ideal 
% Deviation 
form Ideal 
Alabama 3,647,277 7 521,040 17,037 17,037 3.17% 
Alaska 522,853 1 522,853 15,223 15,223 2.83% 
Arizona 4,763,003 9 529,223 8,854 8,854 1.65% 
Arkansas 2,204,443 4 551,111 -13,035 13,035 -2.42% 
California 27,958,916 53 527,527 10,550 10,550 1.96% 
Colorado 3,803,587 7 543,370 -5,293 5,293 -0.98% 
Connecticut 2,757,082 5 551,416 -13,340 13,340 -2.48% 
Delaware 692,169 1 692,169 -154,093 154,093 -28.64% 
Florida 14,799,219 27 548,119 -10,043 10,043 -1.87% 
Georgia 7,196,101 14 514,007 24,069 24,069 4.47% 
Hawaii 1,056,483 2 528,242 9,835 9,835 1.83% 
Idaho 1,138,510 2 569,255 -31,179 31,179 -5.79% 
Illinois 9,701,453 18 538,970 -893 893 -0.17% 
Indiana 4,875,504 9 541,723 -3,646 3,646 -0.68% 
Iowa 2,318,362 4 579,591 -41,514 41,514 -7.72% 
Kansas 2,126,179 4 531,545 6,531 6,531 1.21% 
Kentucky 3,315,996 6 552,666 -14,590 14,590 -2.71% 
Louisiana 3,415,357 6 569,226 -31,150 31,150 -5.79% 
Maine 1,053,828 2 526,914 11,162 11,162 2.07% 
Maryland 4,420,588 8 552,574 -14,497 14,497 -2.69% 
Massachusetts 5,128,706 9 569,856 -31,780 31,780 -5.91% 
Michigan 7,539,572 14 538,541 -465 465 -0.09% 
Minnesota 4,019,862 8 502,483 35,593 35,593 6.61% 
Mississippi 2,211,742 4 552,936 -14,859 14,859 -2.76% 
Missouri 4,563,491 8 570,436 -32,360 32,360 -6.01% 
Montana 765,852 1 765,852 -227,776 227,776 -42.33% 
Nebraska 1,367,120 3 455,707 82,370 82,370 15.31% 
Nevada 2,035,543 4 508,886 29,190 29,190 5.42% 
New Hampshire 1,029,236 2 514,618 23,458 23,458 4.36% 
New Jersey 6,726,680 12 560,557 -22,480 22,480 -4.18% 
New Mexico 1,540,507 3 513,502 24,574 24,574 4.57% 
New York 15,053,173 27 557,525 -19,449 19,449 -3.61% 
North Carolina 7,253,848 13 557,988 -19,912 19,912 -3.70% 
North Dakota 522,720 1 522,720 15,356 15,356 2.85% 
Ohio 8,805,753 16 550,360 -12,283 12,283 -2.28% 
Oklahoma 2,821,685 5 564,337 -26,261 26,261 -4.88% 
Oregon 2,964,621 5 592,924 -54,848 54,848 -10.19% 
Pennsylvania 9,910,224 18 550,568 -12,492 12,492 -2.32% 
Rhode Island 828,611 2 414,306 123,771 123,771 23.00% 
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tion from Ideal 
% Deviation 
form Ideal 
South Carolina 3,544,890 7 506,413 31,663 31,663 5.88% 
South Dakota 611,383 1 611,383 -73,307 73,307 -13.62% 
Tennessee 4,850,104 9 538,900 -824 824 -0.15% 
Texas 18,279,737 36 507,770 30,306 30,306 5.63% 
Utah 1,892,858 4 473,215 64,862 64,862 12.05% 
Vermont 496,508 1 496,508 41,568 41,568 7.73% 
Virginia 6,147,347 11 558,850 -20,773 20,773 -3.86% 
Washington 5,143,186 10 514,319 23,758 23,758 4.42% 
West Virginia 1,465,576 3 488,525 49,551 49,551 9.21% 
Wisconsin 4,347,494 8 543,437 -5,361 5,361 -1.00% 
Wyoming 428,224 1 428,224 109,852 109,852 20.42% 
       Totals 234,063,163 435 538,076
   Voter Equivalency Ratio 
  
1.85 
   Most Underrepresented 










   
351,547 
  % Max Deviation 
     
65.33%
Mean Absolute Deviation 
    
33,953
 % Mean Abs Deviation 
     
6.31%











tion from Ideal 
% Deviation 
form Ideal 
Alabama 3,472,784 7 496,112 -7,958 7,958 -1.63% 
Alaska 492,159 1 492,159 -4,005 4,005 -0.82% 
Arizona 4,220,784 9 468,976 19,178 19,178 3.93% 
Arkansas 2,081,031 4 520,258 -32,104 32,104 -6.58% 
California 22,921,454 53 432,480 55,673 55,673 11.40% 
Colorado 3,529,590 7 504,227 -16,074 16,074 -3.29% 
Connecticut 2,514,825 5 502,965 -14,811 14,811 -3.03% 
Delaware 648,840 1 648,840 -160,686 160,686 -32.92% 
Florida 12,939,596 27 479,244 8,909 8,909 1.83% 
Georgia 6,464,406 14 461,743 26,410 26,410 5.41% 
Hawaii 960,041 2 480,021 8,133 8,133 1.67% 
Idaho 1,071,526 2 535,763 -47,609 47,609 -9.75% 
Illinois 8,788,929 18 488,274 -120 120 -0.02% 
Indiana 4,698,660 9 522,073 -33,920 33,920 -6.95% 
Iowa 2,232,917 4 558,229 -70,076 70,076 -14.36% 
Kansas 2,009,563 4 502,391 -14,237 14,237 -2.92% 
Kentucky 3,198,138 6 533,023 -44,869 44,869 -9.19% 
Louisiana 3,246,213 6 541,036 -52,882 52,882 -10.83% 
Maine 1,038,335 2 519,168 -31,014 31,014 -6.35% 
Maryland 3,999,682 8 499,960 -11,807 11,807 -2.42% 
Massachusetts 4,681,091 9 520,121 -31,968 31,968 -6.55% 
Michigan 7,248,403 14 517,743 -29,590 29,590 -6.06% 
Minnesota 3,803,802 8 475,475 12,678 12,678 2.60% 
Mississippi 2,131,049 4 532,762 -44,609 44,609 -9.14% 
Missouri 4,365,737 8 545,717 -57,564 57,564 -11.79% 
Montana 758,805 1 758,805 -270,651 270,651 -55.44% 
Nebraska 1,305,876 3 435,292 52,862 52,862 10.83% 
Nevada 1,750,950 4 437,738 50,416 50,416 10.33% 
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tion from Ideal 
% Deviation 
form Ideal 
New Hampshire 1,000,167 2 500,084 -11,930 11,930 -2.44% 
New Jersey 5,819,152 12 484,929 3,224 3,224 0.66% 
New Mexico 1,407,025 3 469,008 19,145 19,145 3.92% 
New York 13,121,745 27 485,991 2,163 2,163 0.44% 
North Carolina 6,791,748 13 522,442 -34,289 34,289 -7.02% 
North Dakota 517,347 1 517,347 -29,193 29,193 -5.98% 
Ohio 8,568,112 16 535,507 -47,353 47,353 -9.70% 
Oklahoma 2,669,051 5 533,810 -45,657 45,657 -9.35% 
Oregon 2,762,313 5 552,463 -64,309 64,309 -13.17% 
Pennsylvania 9,567,164 18 531,509 -43,356 43,356 -8.88% 
Rhode Island 762,810 2 381,405 106,749 106,749 21.87% 
South Carolina 3,387,826 7 483,975 4,178 4,178 0.86% 
South Dakota 599,838 1 599,838 -111,684 111,684 -22.88% 
Tennessee 4,621,221 9 513,469 -25,315 25,315 -5.19% 
Texas 15,492,550 36 430,349 57,805 57,805 11.84% 
Utah 1,776,843 4 444,211 43,943 43,943 9.00% 
Vermont 489,123 1 489,123 -969 969 -0.20% 
Virginia 5,658,358 11 514,396 -26,243 26,243 -5.38% 
Washington 4,724,989 10 472,499 15,655 15,655 3.21% 
West Virginia 1,442,796 3 480,932 7,222 7,222 1.48% 
Wisconsin 4,174,726 8 521,841 -33,687 33,687 -6.90% 
Wyoming 416,693 1 416,693 71,461 71,461 14.64% 
       Totals 212,346,783 435 488,154 
   Voter Equivalency Ratio 
  
1.99 
   Most Underrepresented 










   
377,400 
  % Max Deviation 
     
77.31% 
Mean Absolute Deviation 
    
40,327 
 % Mean Abs Deviation 
     
8.26% 









tion from Ideal 
% Deviation 
form Ideal 
Alabama 3,647,277 7 521,040 17,037 17,037 3.17% 
Alaska 522,853 1 522,853 15,223 15,223 2.83% 
Arizona 4,763,003 9 529,223 8,854 8,854 1.65% 
Arkansas 2,204,443 4 551,111 -13,035 13,035 -2.42% 
California 27,958,916 52 537,671 405 405 0.08% 
Colorado 3,803,587 7 543,370 -5,293 5,293 -0.98% 
Connecticut 2,757,082 5 551,416 -13,340 13,340 -2.48% 
Delaware 692,169 1 692,169 -154,093 154,093 -28.64% 
Florida 14,799,219 27 548,119 -10,043 10,043 -1.87% 
Georgia 7,196,101 13 553,546 -15,470 15,470 -2.88% 
Hawaii 1,056,483 2 528,242 9,835 9,835 1.83% 
Idaho 1,138,510 2 569,255 -31,179 31,179 -5.79% 
Illinois 9,701,453 18 538,970 -893 893 -0.17% 
Indiana 4,875,504 9 541,723 -3,646 3,646 -0.68% 
Iowa 2,318,362 4 579,591 -41,514 41,514 -7.72% 
Kansas 2,126,179 4 531,545 6,531 6,531 1.21% 
Kentucky 3,315,996 6 552,666 -14,590 14,590 -2.71% 
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tion from Ideal 
% Deviation 
form Ideal 
Louisiana 3,415,357 6 569,226 -31,150 31,150 -5.79% 
Maine 1,053,828 2 526,914 11,162 11,162 2.07% 
Maryland 4,420,588 8 552,574 -14,497 14,497 -2.69% 
Massachusetts 5,128,706 10 512,871 25,206 25,206 4.68% 
Michigan 7,539,572 14 538,541 -465 465 -0.09% 
Minnesota 4,019,862 7 574,266 -36,190 36,190 -6.73% 
Mississippi 2,211,742 4 552,936 -14,859 14,859 -2.76% 
Missouri 4,563,491 8 570,436 -32,360 32,360 -6.01% 
Montana 765,852 2 382,926 155,150 155,150 28.83% 
Nebraska 1,367,120 3 455,707 82,370 82,370 15.31% 
Nevada 2,035,543 4 508,886 29,190 29,190 5.42% 
New Hampshire 1,029,236 2 514,618 23,458 23,458 4.36% 
New Jersey 6,726,680 13 517,437 20,639 20,639 3.84% 
New Mexico 1,540,507 3 513,502 24,574 24,574 4.57% 
New York 15,053,173 28 537,613 463 463 0.09% 
North Carolina 7,253,848 13 557,988 -19,912 19,912 -3.70% 
North Dakota 522,720 1 522,720 15,356 15,356 2.85% 
Ohio 8,805,753 16 550,360 -12,283 12,283 -2.28% 
Oklahoma 2,821,685 5 564,337 -26,261 26,261 -4.88% 
Oregon 2,964,621 6 494,104 43,973 43,973 8.17% 
Pennsylvania 9,910,224 18 550,568 -12,492 12,492 -2.32% 
Rhode Island 828,611 2 414,306 123,771 123,771 23.00% 
South Carolina 3,544,890 7 506,413 31,663 31,663 5.88% 
South Dakota 611,383 1 611,383 -73,307 73,307 -13.62% 
Tennessee 4,850,104 9 538,900 -824 824 -0.15% 
Texas 18,279,737 34 537,639 437 437 0.08% 
Utah 1,892,858 4 473,215 64,862 64,862 12.05% 
Vermont 496,508 1 496,508 41,568 41,568 7.73% 
Virginia 6,147,347 11 558,850 -20,773 20,773 -3.86% 
Washington 5,143,186 10 514,319 23,758 23,758 4.42% 
West Virginia 1,465,576 3 488,525 49,551 49,551 9.21% 
Wisconsin 4,347,494 8 543,437 -5,361 5,361 -1.00% 
Wyoming 428,224 1 428,224 109,852 109,852 20.42% 
       Totals 234,063,163 435 538,076 
   Voter Equivalency Ratio 
  
1.81 
   Most Underrepresented 
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  % Max Deviation 
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Mean Absolute Deviation 
    
30,774 
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tion from Ideal 
% Deviation 
form Ideal 
Alabama 3,472,784 7 496,112 -7,958 7,958 -1.63% 
Alaska 492,159 1 492,159 -4,005 4,005 -0.82% 
Arizona 4,220,784 9 468,976 19,178 19,178 3.93% 
Arkansas 2,081,031 4 520,258 -32,104 32,104 -6.58% 
California 22,921,454 47 487,691 463 463 0.09% 
Colorado 3,529,590 7 504,227 -16,074 16,074 -3.29% 
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tion from Ideal 
% Deviation 
form Ideal 
Connecticut 2,514,825 5 502,965 -14,811 14,811 -3.03% 
Delaware 648,840 1 648,840 -160,686 160,686 -32.92% 
Florida 12,939,596 26 497,677 -9,523 9,523 -1.95% 
Georgia 6,464,406 13 497,262 -9,108 9,108 -1.87% 
Hawaii 960,041 2 480,021 8,133 8,133 1.67% 
Idaho 1,071,526 2 535,763 -47,609 47,609 -9.75% 
Illinois 8,788,929 18 488,274 -120 120 -0.02% 
Indiana 4,698,660 10 469,866 18,288 18,288 3.75% 
Iowa 2,232,917 5 446,583 41,570 41,570 8.52% 
Kansas 2,009,563 4 502,391 -14,237 14,237 -2.92% 
Kentucky 3,198,138 7 456,877 31,277 31,277 6.41% 
Louisiana 3,246,213 7 463,745 24,409 24,409 5.00% 
Maine 1,038,335 2 519,168 -31,014 31,014 -6.35% 
Maryland 3,999,682 8 499,960 -11,807 11,807 -2.42% 
Massachusetts 4,681,091 10 468,109 20,044 20,044 4.11% 
Michigan 7,248,403 15 483,227 4,927 4,927 1.01% 
Minnesota 3,803,802 8 475,475 12,678 12,678 2.60% 
Mississippi 2,131,049 4 532,762 -44,609 44,609 -9.14% 
Missouri 4,365,737 9 485,082 3,072 3,072 0.63% 
Montana 758,805 2 379,403 108,751 108,751 22.28% 
Nebraska 1,305,876 3 435,292 52,862 52,862 10.83% 
Nevada 1,750,950 4 437,738 50,416 50,416 10.33% 
New Hampshire 1,000,167 2 500,084 -11,930 11,930 -2.44% 
New Jersey 5,819,152 12 484,929 3,224 3,224 0.66% 
New Mexico 1,407,025 3 469,008 19,145 19,145 3.92% 
New York 13,121,745 27 485,991 2,163 2,163 0.44% 
North Carolina 6,791,748 14 485,125 3,029 3,029 0.62% 
North Dakota 517,347 1 517,347 -29,193 29,193 -5.98% 
Ohio 8,568,112 17 504,007 -15,853 15,853 -3.25% 
Oklahoma 2,669,051 5 533,810 -45,657 45,657 -9.35% 
Oregon 2,762,313 6 460,386 27,768 27,768 5.69% 
Pennsylvania 9,567,164 19 503,535 -15,381 15,381 -3.15% 
Rhode Island 762,810 2 381,405 106,749 106,749 21.87% 
South Carolina 3,387,826 7 483,975 4,178 4,178 0.86% 
South Dakota 599,838 1 599,838 -111,684 111,684 -22.88% 
Tennessee 4,621,221 9 513,469 -25,315 25,315 -5.19% 
Texas 15,492,550 31 499,760 -11,606 11,606 -2.38% 
Utah 1,776,843 4 444,211 43,943 43,943 9.00% 
Vermont 489,123 1 489,123 -969 969 -0.20% 
Virginia 5,658,358 12 471,530 16,624 16,624 3.41% 
Washington 4,724,989 10 472,499 15,655 15,655 3.21% 
West Virginia 1,442,796 3 480,932 7,222 7,222 1.48% 
Wisconsin 4,174,726 8 521,841 -33,687 33,687 -6.90% 
Wyoming 416,693 1 416,693 71,461 71,461 14.64% 
       Totals 212,346,783 435 488,154 
   Voter Equivalency Ratio 
  
1.71 
   Most Underrepresented 
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Appendix Table 6. Apportionment Populations in 1970. 
State AP VAP  State AP VAP 
Alabama 3,475,885 2,205,486  Montana 701,573 440,583 
Alaska 304,067 180,582  Nebraska 1,496,820 973,236 
Arizona 1,787,620 1,123,322  Nevada 492,396 318,151 
Arkansas 1,942,303 1,264,709  New Hampshire 746,284 482,655 
California 20,098,863 13,300,316  New Jersey 7,208,035 4,777,221 
Colorado 2,226,771 1,429,241  New Mexico 1,026,664 607,575 
Connecticut 3,050,693 2,007,601  New York 18,338,055 12,368,821 
Delaware 551,928 350,952  North Carolina 5,125,230 3,312,968 
Florida 6,855,702 4,671,090  North Dakota 624,181 390,141 
Georgia 4,627,306 2,938,518  Ohio 10,730,200 6,902,333 
Hawaii 784,901 492,986  Oklahoma 2,585,486 1,718,812 
Idaho 719,921 447,806  Oregon 2,110,810 1,391,451 
Illinois 11,184,320 7,303,995  Pennsylvania 11,884,314 7,932,551 
Indiana 5,228,156 3,346,442  Rhode Island 957,798 647,196 
Iowa 2,846,920 1,845,655  South Carolina 2,617,320 1,628,670 
Kansas 2,265,846 1,498,187  South Dakota 673,247 422,664 
Kentucky 3,246,481 2,099,823  Tennessee 3,961,060 2,590,564 
Louisiana 3,672,008 2,246,435  Texas 11,298,787 7,177,011 
Maine 1,006,320 647,166  Utah 1,067,810 632,973 
Maryland 3,953,698 2,536,241  Vermont 448,327 286,767 
Massachusetts 5,726,676 3,802,869  Virginia 4,690,742 3,051,904 
Michigan 8,937,196 5,611,114  Washington 3,443,487 2,244,939 
Minnesota 3,833,173 2,416,752  West Virginia 1,763,331 1,159,497 
Mississippi 2,233,848 1,367,736  Wisconsin 4,447,013 2,827,453 
Missouri 4,718,034 3,117,564  Wyoming 335,719 212,233 
       




 National Ideal  
District Size 469,088 305,175 
 
Appendix Table 7. Apportionment Populations in 1980. 
State AP VAP VEP 
 
State AP VAP VEP 
Alabama 3,890,061 2,731,640 2,726,249  Montana 786,690 554,795 554,636 
Alaska 400,481 271,106 270,122  Nebraska 1,570,006 1,122,655 1,115,142 
Arizona 2,717,866 1,926,728 1,890,167  Nevada 799,184 584,694 573,118 
Arkansas 2,285,513 1,615,061 1,610,104  New Hampshire 920,610 662,528 660,560 
California 23,668,562 17,278,944 15,610,966  New Jersey 7,364,158 5,373,962 5,123,773 
Colorado 2,888,834 2,081,151 2,071,959  New Mexico 1,299,968 884,987 873,515 
Connecticut 3,107,576 2,284,657 2,201,356  New York 17,557,288 12,870,209 12,006,100 
Delaware 595,225 427,743 421,344  North Carolina 5,874,429 4,224,031 4,203,817 
Florida 9,739,992 7,386,688 7,088,658  North Dakota 652,695 461,726 462,223 
Georgia 5,464,265 3,816,975 3,791,652  Ohio 10,797,419 7,703,310 7,637,813 
Hawaii 965,000 689,108 646,583  Oklahoma 3,025,266 2,170,406 2,162,051 
Idaho 943,935 637,270 633,624  Oregon 2,632,663 1,910,048 1,880,863 
Illinois 11,418,461 8,183,481 7,868,300  Pennsylvania 11,866,728 8,740,599 8,664,166 
Indiana 5,490,179 3,871,906 3,846,321  Rhode Island 947,154 704,303 675,067 
Iowa 2,913,387 2,087,935 2,070,935  South Carolina 3,119,208 2,179,854 2,176,721 
Kansas 2,363,208 1,714,644 1,704,420  South Dakota 690,178 485,162 484,328 
Kentucky 3,661,433 2,578,047 2,562,572  Tennessee 4,590,750 3,292,560 3,285,608 
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Appendix Table 7. Cont. 
State AP VAP VEP 
 
State AP VAP VEP 
Louisiana 4,203,972 2,875,432 2,868,792  Texas 14,228,383 9,923,085 9,572,904 
Maine 1,124,660 803,273 799,746  Utah 1,461,037 920,932 915,484 
Maryland 4,216,446 3,049,445 2,964,704  Vermont 511,456 366,138 363,143 
Massachusetts 5,737,037 4,246,648 4,110,721  Virginia 5,346,279 3,872,484 3,830,887 
Michigan 9,258,344 6,510,092 6,374,955  Washington 4,130,163 2,992,796 2,923,670 
Minnesota 4,077,148 2,904,162 2,882,406  West Virginia 1,949,644 1,390,008 1,387,231 
Mississippi 2,520,638 1,706,441 1,704,163  Wisconsin 4,705,335 3,347,947 3,322,053 
Missouri 4,917,444 3,554,203 3,529,489  Wyoming 470,816 324,004 326,644 
    
     
    
 Total 225,867,174 162,296,003 157,431,825 
    
 National Ideal 
District Size 519,235 373,094 361,912 
Appendix Table 8. Apportionment Populations in 1990. 
State AP VAP VEP 
 
State AP VAP VEP 
Alabama 4,062,608 2,981,799 2,956,385  Montana 803,655 576,961 573,045 
Alaska 551,947 377,699 364,419  Nebraska 1,584,617 1,149,373 1,131,746 
Arizona 3,677,985 2,684,109 2,523,614  Nevada 1,206,152 904,885 858,018 
Arkansas 2,362,239 1,729,594 1,710,799  New Hampshire 1,113,915 830,497 814,549 
California 29,839,250 22,009,296 18,156,500  New Jersey 7,748,634 5,930,726 5,429,251 
Colorado 3,307,912 2,433,128 2,366,650  New Mexico 1,521,779 1,068,328 1,026,902 
Connecticut 3,295,669 2,537,535 2,383,795  New York 18,044,505 13,730,906 12,271,903 
Delaware 668,696 502,827 486,760  North Carolina 6,657,630 5,022,488 4,938,968 
Florida 13,003,362 10,071,689 9,145,312  North Dakota 641,364 463,415 461,711 
Georgia 6,508,419 4,750,913 4,588,953  Ohio 10,887,325 8,047,371 7,975,680 
Hawaii 1,115,274 828,103 770,836  Oklahoma 3,157,604 2,308,578 2,251,719 
Idaho 1,011,986 698,344 690,154  Oregon 2,853,733 2,118,191 2,057,833 
Illinois 11,466,682 8,484,236 8,029,525  Pennsylvania 11,924,710 9,086,833 8,962,083 
Indiana 5,564,228 4,088,195 4,080,236  Rhode Island 1,005,984 777,774 725,084 
Iowa 2,787,424 2,057,875 2,030,935  South Carolina 3,505,707 2,566,496 2,537,384 
Kansas 2,485,600 1,815,960 1,783,412  South Dakota 699,999 497,542 494,849 
Kentucky 3,698,969 2,731,202 2,722,356  Tennessee 4,896,641 3,660,581 3,624,940 
Louisiana 4,238,216 2,992,704 2,959,148  Texas 17,059,805 12,150,671 11,034,190 
Maine 1,233,223 918,926 910,982  Utah 1,727,784 1,095,406 1,086,050 
Maryland 4,798,622 3,619,227 3,397,126  Vermont 564,964 419,675 415,564 
Massachusetts 6,029,051 4,663,350 4,384,671  Virginia 6,216,568 4,682,620 4,512,504 
Michigan 9,328,784 6,836,532 6,693,069  Washington 4,887,941 3,605,305 3,421,256 
Minnesota 4,387,029 3,208,316 3,136,830  West Virginia 1,801,625 1,349,900 1,347,723 
Mississippi 2,586,443 1,826,455 1,824,156  Wisconsin 4,906,745 3,602,787 3,541,548 
Missouri 5,137,804 3,802,247 3,740,308  Wyoming 455,975 318,063 312,961 
         
     Total 249,022,783 184,615,633 173,644,393 
    
 National Ideal 
District Size 572,466 424,404 399,183 
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Appendix Table 9. Apportionment Populations in 2000. 
State AP VAP VEP 
 
State AP VAP VEP 
Alabama 4,461,130 3,323,678 2,956,385  Montana 905,316 672,133 573,045 
Alaska 628,933 436,215 364,419  Nebraska 1,715,369 1,261,021 1,131,746 
Arizona 5,140,683 3,763,685 2,523,614  Nevada 2,002,032 1,486,458 858,018 
Arkansas 2,679,733 1,993,031 1,710,799  New Hampshire 1,238,415 926,224 814,549 
California 33,930,798 24,621,819 18,156,500  New Jersey 8,424,354 6,326,792 5,429,251 
Colorado 4,311,882 3,200,466 2,366,650  New Mexico 1,823,821 1,310,472 1,026,902 
Connecticut 3,409,535 2,563,877 2,383,795  New York 19,004,973 14,286,350 12,271,903 
Delaware 785,068 589,013 486,760  North Carolina 8,067,673 6,085,266 4,938,968 
Florida 16,028,890 12,336,038 9,145,312  North Dakota 643,756 481,351 461,711 
Georgia 8,206,975 6,017,219 4,588,953  Ohio 11,374,540 8,464,801 7,975,680 
Hawaii 1,216,642 915,770 770,836  Oklahoma 3,458,819 2,558,294 2,251,719 
Idaho 1,297,274 924,923 690,154  Oregon 3,428,543 2,574,873 2,057,833 
Illinois 12,439,042 9,173,842 8,029,525  Pennsylvania 12,300,670 9,358,833 8,962,083 
Indiana 6,090,782 4,506,089 4,080,236  Rhode Island 1,049,662 800,497 725,084 
Iowa 2,931,923 2,192,686 2,030,935  South Carolina 4,025,061 3,002,371 2,537,384 
Kansas 2,693,824 1,975,425 1,783,412  South Dakota 756,874 552,195 494,849 
Kentucky 4,049,431 3,046,951 2,722,356  Tennessee 5,700,037 4,290,762 3,624,940 
Louisiana 4,480,271 3,249,177 2,959,148  Texas 20,903,994 14,965,061 11,034,190 
Maine 1,277,731 973,685 910,982  Utah 2,236,714 1,514,471 1,086,050 
Maryland 5,307,886 3,940,314 3,397,126  Vermont 609,890 461,304 415,564 
Massachusetts 6,355,568 4,849,033 4,384,671  Virginia 7,100,702 5,340,253 4,512,504 
Michigan 9,955,829 7,342,677 6,693,069  Washington 5,908,684 4,380,278 3,421,256 
Minnesota 4,925,670 3,632,585 3,136,830  West Virginia 1,813,077 1,405,951 1,347,723 
Mississippi 2,852,927 2,069,471 1,824,156  Wisconsin 5,371,210 3,994,919 3,541,548 
Missouri 5,606,260 4,167,519 3,740,308  Wyoming 495,304 364,909 312,961 
         
     Total 281,424,177 208,671,027 173,644,393 
    
 National Ideal 
District Size 646,952 479,704 399,183 
Appendix Table 10. Apportionment Populations in 2000. 
State AP VAP VEP 
 
State AP VAP VEP 
Alabama  4,779,736 3,647,277 3,472,784  Montana  989,415 765,852 758,805 
Alaska  710,231 522,853 492,159  Nebraska  1,826,341 1,367,120 1,305,876 
Arizona  6,392,017 4,763,003 4,220,784  Nevada  2,700,551 2,035,543 1,750,950 
Arkansas  2,915,918 2,204,443 2,081,031  New Hampshire  1,316,470 1,029,236 1,000,167 
California  37,253,956 27,958,916 22,921,454  New Jersey  8,791,894 6,726,680 5,819,152 
Colorado  5,029,196 3,803,587 3,529,590  New Mexico  2,059,179 1,540,507 1,407,025 
Connecticut  3,574,097 2,757,082 2,514,825  New York  19,378,102 15,053,173 13,121,745 
Delaware  897,934 692,169 648,840  North Carolina  9,535,483 7,253,848 6,791,748 
Florida  18,801,310 14,799,219 12,939,596  North Dakota  672,591 522,720 517,347 
Georgia  9,687,653 7,196,101 6,464,406  Ohio  11,536,504 8,805,753 8,568,112 
Hawaii  1,360,301 1,056,483 960,041  Oklahoma  3,751,351 2,821,685 2,669,051 
Idaho  1,567,582 1,138,510 1,071,526  Oregon  3,831,074 2,964,621 2,762,313 
Illinois  12,830,632 9,701,453 8,788,929  Pennsylvania  12,702,379 9,910,224 9,567,164 
Indiana  6,483,802 4,875,504 4,698,660  Rhode Island  1,052,567 828,611 762,810 
Iowa  3,046,355 2,318,362 2,232,917  South Carolina  4,625,364 3,544,890 3,387,826 
Kansas  2,853,118 2,126,179 2,009,563  South Dakota  814,180 611,383 599,838 
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Appendix Table 10. Cont. 
State AP VAP VEP 
 
State AP VAP VEP 
Kentucky  4,339,367 3,315,996 3,198,138  Tennessee  6,346,105 4,850,104 4,621,221 
Louisiana  4,533,372 3,415,357 3,246,213  Texas  25,145,561 18,279,737 15,492,550 
Maine  1,328,361 1,053,828 1,038,335  Utah  2,763,885 1,892,858 1,776,843 
Maryland  5,773,552 4,420,588 3,999,682  Vermont  625,741 496,508 489,123 
Massachusetts  6,547,629 5,128,706 4,681,091  Virginia  8,001,024 6,147,347 5,658,358 
Michigan  9,883,640 7,539,572 7,248,403  Washington  6,724,540 5,143,186 4,724,989 
Minnesota  5,303,925 4,019,862 3,803,802  West Virginia  1,852,994 1,465,576 1,442,796 
Mississippi  2,967,297 2,211,742 2,131,049  Wisconsin  5,686,986 4,347,494 4,174,726 
Missouri  5,988,927 4,563,491 4,365,737  Wyoming  563,626 428,224 416,693 
         
     Total 308,143,815 234,063,163 212,346,783 
    
 National Ideal 
District Size 708,377 538,076 488,154 
 
